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I. The Nature of the Critical Problem 
On January 8, 1790, George Washington pioneered the 
constitutional duty of addressing Congress when he delivered his 
First State of the Union Message. 1 In 1801, Thomas Jefferson 
broke the "precedent" of speaking directly to Congress by 
allowing his State of the Union Message to be read to congress by 
a clerk. 2 This written practice established by Jefferson 
continued until 1913 when Woodrow Wilson personally appeared on 
Capitol Hill to deliver his address to an astonished audience. 3 
Since that strategic departure, the State of the Union Address 
has been an important mode of oral political rhetoric. Its 
importance to the contemporary critic of political discourse 
should not be underestimated. 
The State of the Union Address is vital to the rhetorical 
critic. Initially, the speech has an important source. 
Obviously, the words of the individual occupying our nation's 
highest office are crucial from a rhetorical standpoint. 
Secondly, the State of the Union message has a large and 
important audience. It is now given to both bodies of Congress, 
members of the president's cabinet, important judicial leaders, 
and a prime-time national television audience as well as 
interested international leaders viewing from abroad. Clearly, 
the address receives much attention -- before, during, and after 
the event. In addition, the speech involves important subject 
matter. In reporting on the state of the union, the president 
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must deal with the most pressing of domestic issues and the most 
troubling of foreign concerns. The crucial content of this mode 
of discourse is evidenced by the fact that "almost every 
significant event and policy in the country's history is told of 
or foreshadowed in these messages."4 Finally, the State of the 
Union Address is important symbolically. The tradition of our 
leader annually addressing congress and the nation on the 
condition of our affairs is one of the most entrenched political 
and rhetorical phenomena in the United States. From any 
perspective, the State of the Union Address is important to the 
evaluator of rhetoric. 
Despite the significance of the address, little has been 
written to analyze, define, and explain it. 5 This lack of 
rhetorical analysis of State of the Union messages is unfortunate 
because they are inherently problematic. Since the constitution 
places no limits upon what a president may say in his annual 
speech 6 , a president is free to use the occasion as he sees 
fit. This latitude given to the presidential rhetor is 
especially alarming considering the apparent functional duality 
of the State of the Union Address. The critical problem becomes 
the discernment of the "proper" function of the address -- to 
decide whether the message is intended to meet deliberative or 
epideictic purposes. 
Aristotle in Rhetoric first distinguished between 
deliberative rhetoric (which concerns itself with policy and 
legislation) and epideictic rhetoric (ceremonial speeches 
delivered on special occasions). The deliberative address of 
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judicial or legislative origin is usually "more narrowly 
argumentative and decision oriented" as it directs itself "toward 
more specific policies and goals." 7 Sharply contrasting this 
type of rhetoric is the epideictic speech. Karlyn Kohrs Campbell 
in The Rhetorical Act offered numerous characteristics of this 
genre: commemoration of the occasion, poetic and figurative 
language, psychologically appealing supporting materials which 
reflect cultural values, and a ritualistic rather than logical 
development. 8 Other authors have given related descriptions of 
the epideictic: a speech of praise and blame (Chase 1961), a 
speech prepatory to some action which is not made explicit 
(Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969), and a speech which has a performative 
nature constituting an end in itself (Beale 1978). 9 Another 
ess~ntial difference between deliberative and epideictic rhetoric 
is the nature of the audience involved in each type. Speeches 
requiring the audience to judge (in a policy sense) are 
deliberative: speeches calling upon the audience to be spectators 
are epideictic. 10 To exemplify_the contrast explained above, one 
would offer the deliberative Congressional speech from a Senator 
supporting a mandatory sentencing bill and the epideictic Fourth 
of July address delivered by a patriotic American before an 
interested group of on-lookers. Unfortunately, the distinction 
between epideictic and deliberative rhetoric is not always that 
clear. A case in point is the State of the Union address, which 
has both a deliberative and an epideictic nature. 
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Article II, Section 3 of our Constitution mandates that a 
president "give to the congress information on the state of the 
Union" and to recommend "such measures as he shall judge 
necessary and expedient." From this wording alone the 
deliberative nature of the State of the Union address becomes 
clear. The Founding Fathers "clearly expected a plain report on 
the state of our affairs" 11 and direction in courses of 
legislative action. One author defines the speech as "an 
explicit attempt by the president to influence the perceived 
salience of selected issues in the public mind and among members 
of Congress. 012 The New York Times recently noted that a 
president uses the speech "to define his legislative agenda." 13
Ronald Reagan, like his predecessors, had the opportunity to use 
the address to "set an agenda for the nation's policy making. 014 
These predecessors often realized that opportunity. In 1823 the 
president argued for the Monroe Doctrine; Theodore Roosevelt used 
his address to push trust-busting legislation; and Woodrow Wilson 
established his Fourteen Points for Peace in the 1918 State of 
the Union address. 15
One of Ronald Reagan's chief speech writers echoed the 
deliberative nature of the address: "The State of the Union is 
the most comprehensive speech a President gives •••• It has the 
most fact-checking and negotiating-of-priorities of any speech. 
On the other hand, it's the least 'speechy' because of the 
laundry list nature it takes on. There is less room for rhetoric 
•••• It's more of a paper and less of a speech." 16 William 
Safire agreed with the idea that the State of the Union has no 
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room for flashy rhetoric because "a message to Congress is 
necessarily laden with programmatic weight." 17 A comparison to 
the more epideictic Inaugural Address illuminates the uniqueness 
given to the State of the Union address as a specific policy 
document: 
These messages, far more than the Inaugural Addresses, 
foretell, and frequently outline, momentous coming events 
and policies in our political, social, and military 
history. The Inaugurals are, to a considerable extent, 
show pieces splashed on a broad canvas. Far more 
history-in-the-making is wrapped up in the State-of-the-
Union Messages, which, with their specific content, show 
the Presidents in action.IS 
All in all, these ideas support the deliberative nature of the 
address as a policy speech separated Constitutionally from 
exclusive epideictic ceremony. However, the speech is also "the 
one speech by the President that occurs every year at the same 
time and in the same place, with the same audience, and with the 
same ritual introductions, so that a sort of frame is placed 
around it which connects it to the past and encourages 
recollection and comparison." 19 This nature of the State of the 
Union address introduces the duality of the speech. 
The ritualistic characteristic of the State of the Union 
address is indisputable. Begun in 1790 by George Washington, 
there have been only two breaks in the tradition in one hundred 
and ninety-eight years of presidential succession {Harrison, who 
died one month after taking office; and Garfield, who was 
assassinated). 20 Ronald Reagan, in his 1982 State of the Union 
speech, referred to his "duty as old as our republic itself" 
(1982 State of the Union speech, paragraph 2). In 1984, he spoke 
of the "time-honored tradition" (1984,1) brought by the 
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occasion. The convention of holding the event annually adds 
considerable splendor to the policy obligation. Writers have 
acknowledged the State of the union address as a "ceremonial 
occasion1121 and as "one of the majestic occasions of national and 
even world politics." 22 Some refer to "the grandeur of the 
ritual. 1123 Clearly, it is much more than an address of policy. 
The State of the Union message's epideictic nature can also 
be identified in terms of the characteristics discussed 
previously. Campbell's characterization of poetic and figurative 
language within epideictic rhetoric surely applies to the State 
of the Union address. The speech usually contains language which 
is "gripping" and "electric1124-- often in the form of "stirring 
quotes from past presidents." 25 Edward Boykin, in the preface to 
his anthology of State of the Union messages, noted that many of 
these "eloquent" speeches contained "words that often glow like 
jewels. 1126 Secondly, the duty to assess our nation often calls 
for "praise and blame" rhetoric consonant with the analysis of 
Chase. In addition, the State of the Union address is truly as 
much a "performance" of our nation's leader on national 
television as a policy rendition to Congress. Finally, although 
the primary audience is reasonably considered to be Congress, few 
would dispute the fact that the president is also addressing 
millions of "spectators" at home watching their television 
screens. Clearly, then, the State of the Union address also has 
an epideictic nature. 
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Given this duality, it is reasonable to conclude that a 
president must utilize epideictic as well as deliberative 
rhetoric in this situation. In a sense, however, the 
deliberative nature of the State of the Union address seems 
predominate. There is essentially no reason for the pomp and 
ceremony of the occasion without the constitutional mandate to 
report and to recommend to Congress upon matters of policy. The 
deliberative nature of the address is a priori; without it, the 
epideictic nature becomes almost unimportant. It seems that 
deliberative renditions of our nation's condition can stand on 
their own constitutionally while exclusively epideictic 
performances cannot. In other words, a president who neglects 
the epideictic function of the address is merely considered 
boring; while a president who neglects the deliberative function 
may be criticized for failing to meet a Constitutional 
requirement. 
At any rate, the State of the Union Address is neither 
exclusively deliberative nor exclusively epideictic in nature. 
Of course, this problem is not unique to State of the Union 
messages. Since it is one type of discourse which is 
functionally neither fish,nor fowl, the genre is in need of 
analysis. Many methods of rhetorical criticism could be employed 
in order to better understand this mode of discourse. One method 
would be to undertake a case study of a successful rhetorical 
president and his State of the Union messages. In order to do 
this, a model for textual analysis is needed. The model I have 
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chosen for this thesis focuses upon the nature of epideictic 
rhetoric. 
In order to analyze the State of the Union Address in terms 
of epideictic rhetoric, the model of Celeste Michelle Condit can 
be employed as she presented it in Communication Quarterly. 27 
For Condit, "epideictic rhetoric can be located by its tendency 
to serve three functional pairs" 28 -- definition/understanding, 
shaping/sharing, and display/entertainment. The first terms in 
each set refer to the function for the speaker and the latter 
terms to the function for the audience. The first pair in the 
triad, definition/understanding, "refers to the power of 
epideictic to explain the social world. 1129 In this sense, a 
speaker will define and explain issues which are troubling to the 
audience in terms of shared values and common beliefs. The new 
understanding acquired by the audience will comfort them and make 
the i~sue less threatening. 
The second pair, shaping/sharing, refers to the ability of 
epideictic rhetoric to unify the audience as the speaker 
reformulates the shared heritage of the group. The speaker will 
reiterate core values and communal beliefs in order to renew the 
myths and symbols which bond the homogeneous group. In this 
sense of unity, epideictic rhetoric must be non-divisive, in 
contrast to deliberative rhetoric which "pits two sides against 
each other. 1130 As Condit comments, "In epideictic, such a focus. 
on partial interests is anathema. 1131 
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Finally, the display/entertainment pair reflects the 
epideictic invitation for a speaker to display eloquence. After 
such a display, the audience is entertained "in a most humane 
manner." 32 This cathartic notion of epideictic rhetoric renders 
the performance an end in itself. 
Condit's model of epideictic rhetoric can be used to 
thoroughly examine a subset of the State of the Union genre. The 
chosen subset for this thesis is the first six annual messages of 
Ronald Wilson Reagan, which span from 1982 to 1987. Condit's 
functional pairs can be used to locate the epideictic rhetoric 
within Reagan's State of the Union speeches. Of course, Condit's. 
model could also be used to locate epideictic elements within a 
deliberative address. However, the functional pairs which Condit 
postulates do tend to characterize predominantly epideictic 
rhetoric. Therefore, speeches which emphasize these functions 
will be primarily epideictic in nature. In using this model to 
identify the epideictic elements of this subset, much can be 
learned not only about the genre of the State of the Union 
Address, but also about Ronald Reagan as a rhetor. In essence, 
this method should help one to answer the critical problem. 
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II. Epideictic Successes 
A. Define/Understand Functions 
Ronald Reagan often explained problematic issues which 
troubled the nation in terms of shared and accepted values. In 
doing so, the audience was comforted by their new understanding 
of the problems. This comforting of the audience was also 
achieved through Reagan's optimistic tone and attitude in 
presenting the State of the Union address. His positive outlook 
reassured members of the audience who may have been troubled by 
the condition of the nation. An analysis of specific audience 
discomforts and Reagan's handling of those problems will show his 
epideictic success in terms of Condit's first functional pair. 
Reagan often had to deal with economic troubles. For 
example, with a severe recession in 1982 and 1983, the audience 
for Reagan's first two addresses was understandably concerned 
about economic problems. Reagan initially avoided the trouble 
wrought by President Ford's truthful observation that "The state 
of the Union is not good" by defining the crisis in terms of a 
hopeful future: "In the near future, the State of the Union and 
the economy will be better" (1982,30). Assuring the population 
that "this time, however, things are different" (1982, 14): 
Reagan proclaimed that the economy will pull "out of its slump" 
and America will be back on "the road to prosperity" (1983, 29). 
Reagan redefined the troubling economy in terms of a test of 
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American spirit: "Let it be said of us that we, too, did not 
fail: that we, too, worked together to bring America through 
difficult times that we met the test and preserved ••• the 
sacred flame of liberty" (1982, 104). Apparently, the audience 
was supposed to adopt the courage of the President's words from 
his optimistic portrayal of the situation and be comforted 
knowing that the troubles were short-term. In other words, 
Reagan transcended specific economic discomfort by appealing to 
optimism and individual courage in the face of tough times. 
When the recession continued into 1983, Reagan again 
utilized the "test" metaphor by labeling unemployment as a 
"domestic challenge" (1983,46) instead of as a domestic problem. 
In fact, unemployment became such a troubling issue for the 
public in 1983 that Reagan's image became tainted by "unfairness" 
and a lack of compassion. 33 Initially, Reagan dealt with these 
fears by defining an economic state in terms of other positive 
indicators. Citing gains in lowering the inflation rate (1983, 
21), in housing starts (1983, 22), and in "upsurges in 
productivity" (1983, 23) Reagan tried to comfort an audience 
unsure of the economic future. Secondly,. Reagan employed the 
shared value of compassion by offering the needy and suffering 
rhetorical assurances: "For too many of our fellow citizens 
farmers, steel and auto workers, lumbermen, black teenagers, and 
working mothers -- this is a painful period. We must do 
everything in our power to bring their ordeal to an end" (1983, 
3). By remaining positive, redefining the situation in terms of 
a test of American strength, and by verbally assuring the worried 
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audience, Reagan attempted to comfort his listeners with 
epideictic rhetoric. 
There was also much public dismay over Reagan's large 
defense budgets in the wake of huge projected budget deficits and 
social program cuts. Reagan confronted the troubled public by 
appealing to the common values of peace and freedom. Addressing 
the issue in 1984, Reagan chided "we dare not shirk our 
responsibility to keep America free, secure, and at peace" {1984, 
22). By defining the issue in terms of liberty rather than guns, 
Reagan implicitly argued that those against defense spending were 
also against freedom. The same position was voiced by Reagan in 
the following year's address: "Spending for defense is investing 
in things that are priceless -- peace and freedom" {1985, 37). 
Apparently, the concerned public could take comfort in knowing 
that they had purchased a piece of liberty with their tax money. 
Related to this issue of defense spending was the problem of 
Lebanon. Before Reagan's 1984 State of the Union address, 58% of 
the respondents to a Washington Post/ABC poll favored withdrawal 
of American marines from the Lebanon quagmire. 34 In light of 
that malaise, Ronald Reagan faced an audience troubled by the 
Lebanese question. In resp6nse to that confusion, the President 
offered the public an optimistic future despite lacking "a shred 
of evidence." 35 He told his listeners that "we are making 
progress ••• for a free, independent, and sovereign Lebanon" 
{1984, 64). He then defined the situation in terms of American 
pride by proclaiming "We must not be driven from our objectives 
in Lebanon by state-sponsored terrorism" (1984, 64). Finally, 
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Reagan enthymematically compared Lebanon to Grenada with the 
introduction of heroic Sergeant Trujillo (1984, 73). Reagan 
hoped the audience would take comfort in the heroism of the 
servicemen in the Grenada rescue mission and would apply that 
same value of freedom to the situation in Lebanon. Reflecting on 
this rhetorical strategy, one writer concluded that Reagan "knows 
how .to make lemonade out of his own lemons. 1136 By appealing to 
the shared values of independence and American heroism, Reagan 
comforted his audience with respect to the Lebanon crisis. In 
terms of Condit's define/understand epideictic pair, Reagan 
defined progress in Lebanon as a function of fulfilling shared 
American values -- not as a function of dead American soldiers 
(which were not mentioned). In doing so, Reagan avoided 
controversial policy arguments in the hope that the audience 
would unite around these shared values. 
Perhaps Reagan's audience was most troubled about the future 
and the state of the union after the Space Shuttle disaster "sent 
a shudder" across the nation and forced Reagan to postpone 
temporarily the 1986 State of the Union address. 37 In dealing 
with this audience discomfort, Reagan began his speech with a 
tribute which sounded almost eulogistic: "We pause together to 
mourn and honor the valor of our seven Challenger heroes. And I 
hope that we are now ready to do what they would want us to do 
go forward America, and reach for the stars. We will never 
forget those brave seven, but we shall go forward"· ( 1986, 1). 
Drawing upon the shared value of 
1
courage shown by these 
astronauts, Reagan reassured the nation that the program would 
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continue: "Yes, this nation remains fully committed to America's 
space program. We are going forward with our shuttle flights" 
(1986, 38). By explaining the situation as he honored America's 
heroes, Reagan comforted a highly disillusioned audience. 
Perhaps the biggest blow to the Reagan presidency was the 
involvement of the Administration in selling arms to Iran and 
diverting the funds to the rebels in Nicaragua. Before the State 
of the Union speech in 1987, the New York Times characterized the 
public as "deeply skeptical", "doubtful", "less optimistic", and 
"less trusting of the Government and of the President", largely 
as the result of public concern over the scandal. 38 Reagan 
initially handled his rhetorical problem by admitting to taking 
"a risk with regard to our action in Iran" (1987, 14). But he 
assured the audience that he would deal with the scandal: "We 
will get to the bottom of this and I will take whatever action is 
called for" (1987, 15). Of course, Reagan's focus on the 
epideictic was ideally suited for this situation. A deliberative 
orientation would have forced Reagan to give potentially damaging 
concrete explanations for failure in Iran. By sticking with 
epideictic rhetoric, the president avoided specificity that may 
have been incriminating. In this way, Reagan's promise for vague 
"action" tried to reassure the disillusioned audience without 
indicting his Administration. 
In addition, Reagan essentially attempted to use the ends to 
justify the means by reminding the audience that "the goals were 
worthy" and that "it was not wrong to try to secure freedom for 
our citizens held in barbaric captivity" (1987, 15). In this 
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way, the Administration's failure in Iran was justified by Reagan 
in terms of the audience's value of liberty: "Let it never be 
said of this generation of Americans that we became so obsessed 
with failure that we refused to take risks that could further the 
cause of peace and freedom in the world" (1987, 16). By using 
underlying values which are common to all, Reagan attempted to 
dispel audience discomfort and mistrust about the damaging 
issue. Through epideictic rhetoric, Reagan hoped the audience 
would feel less threatened by the scandal knowing that the 
Administration was handling it and that America was still 
furthering "causes of peace and freedom." 
Finally, Condit's define/understand functional pair locates 
Reagan's epideictic rhetoric in terms of the President's attempts 
to inject optimism into his audience. By showering the public 
with confidence and positive statements, Reagan comforted his 
audience and aided any listener who may have been in doubt about 
the nation's future. The 1982 State of the Union address's 
"amiable optimism" 39 in the midst of economic recession may have 
been one reason why a writer compared Reagan to Voltaire's 
P~ngloss in Candide, who responded "All is well" and "This is the 
best of all worlds" to a series of calamities.40 Reagan's 
"comforting tone" 41 during his 1983 address was reflected in his 
declarations of an "America on the mend" (1983, 4 and 1983, 90} 
and of a citizenry with "good reason to be hopeful" (1983, 87). 
Despite the recession, the audience "would never know it from a 
Reagan performance," 42 essentially due to Reagan's epideictic 
gloss. 
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Perhaps the most optimistic of the six speeches was the 1984 
address. Reagan began it with an epideictic exhortation of 
hope: "There is renewed energy and optimism in the land. 
America is back - standing tall, looking to the 80's with 
courage, confidence, and hope" (1984, 2). Reagan assured the 
audience that the nation was "confronting its problems" and that 
"hope is alive" (1984, 7). After proclaiming "one of the best 
recoveries in decades" (1984, 9) Reagan mocked his critics: 
"Send away the hand-wringers and doubting Thomases. Hope is 
reborn •••• " (1984, 9). Then, in an eloquent instillation of 
comfort about the future, Reagan tried to banish all audience 
worry with this powerful vision: 
I've never felt more strongly that America's best 
days ••• lie ahead. We are a powerful force for good. 
With faith and courage, we can perform great deeds 
and take freedom's next step. And we will. We 
will carry on the traditions of a good and worthy 
people who have brought light where there was darkness, 
warmth where there was cold, medicine where there was 
disease, food where there was hunger, and peace where 
there was only bloodshed. (1984, 80) 
In 1985, Reagan's State of the Union speech was designed to 
be "an uplift of the American spirit" in order to "make people 
feel as they want to -- that they are enlisted in an enterprise 
larger than themselves." 4 3 Reagan largely achieved this goal 
with "bright visions of the future" 44 epitomized by his 
proclamation that "There are no constraints on the human mind, no 
walls around the human spirit ••• " (1985, 15). Reagan's positive 
outlook for the future was also captured well in his 1986 State 
of the Union speech, which included the optimistic reference to 
Back to the Future: "Where we're going, we don't need roads" 
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(1986, 36). Continuing on that path, Reagan assured the audience 
that "America can win the race to the future - and we shall" 
(1986, 48). Finally, Reagan concluded his speech in 1986 with 
typical epideictic eloquence: "In this land of dreams fulfilled 
where greater dreams may be imagined, nothing is impossible, no 
victory is beyond our reach, no glory will ever be too great" 
(1986, 54). 
Not even the Iran-Contra Affair could shake Reagan's 
positive outlook. He again told the audience listening to the 
1987 address that "America isn't finished, her best days have 
just begun" (1987, 83). He also stressed confidence in an 
America "with no limit to our reaches, no boundaries to what we 
can do, no endpoint to our hopes" (1987, 66). Reagan's "usual 
ebullient optimism 114 ~ climaxed at the conclusion of the address 
_when Reagan invoked the spirit of Benjamin Franklin by agreeing 
with him that America's sun is rising, not setting (1987, 82). 
Clearly, then, in terms of Condit's first functional pair, 
Reagan's state of the Union addresses were epideictic successes. 
Troubling issues were redefined in terms of the audience's key 
values and beliefs, thereby comforting worried listeners. In 
remaining positive and optimistic with rhetoric typical of 
epideictic grandeur, Reagan assured his audience of a promising 
future. All of this strategically enabled Ronald Reagan to 
·soothe his audience with the comforting ointment of his rhetoric~ 
18 
B. Share/Shape Functions 
Condit's second functional pair is perhaps the best way to 
locate the epideictic success of Reagan's State of the Union 
addresses. Ronald Reagan masterfully reformulated America's 
shared heritage, values, and beliefs in all of his yearly 
assessments. In doing so, he also avoided the "anathema of 
partial interests" referred to by Condit by ~tressing 
bipartisanship and unity. Robert Dallek noted in The Politics of 
Symbolism that Reagan's "presidency has been a celebration of old 
values. Autonomy, self-help, free enterprise, individualism, 
liberty, hard work, production, morality, religion, and 
patriotism are ••• the identifying symbols of Reagan's 
Administration 1146 ..... That sentiment was evidenced well by 
Reagan's State of the Union messages. 
Initially, Ronald Reagan beautifully reaffirmed the nation's 
belief that America is the best country in the world. In 1982 
Reagan invoked his Inaugural promise of American greatness: "We 
as Americans have the capacity now, as we've had it in the past, 
to do whatever needs to be done to preserve this last and 
greatest bastion of freedom" (1982, 28)., In 1983 Reagan called 
America the "world's technological leader" (1983, 51). In that 
spirit, Reagan later said that America has "the first flowering 
of the man-made miracles of high technology, a field pioneered 
and still led by our country" (1983, 6.2). Reagan's "America is 
back" (1984, 2) theme in 1984 was exemplified in his praising of 
America's "sunrise industries of ,high-tech" (1984, 10). In 
giving a "tribute to American teamwork and excellence" (1984, 
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37), Reagan explained how space is one field where America 
"effectively demonstrates (its) technological leadership and 
ability to make life better on earth" (1984, 36). Finally, as he 
prompted Americans toward greatness, Reagan asked the rhetorical 
question "How can we do less? We are Americans" (1984, 78). 
In the 1985 State of the Union, Reagan observed that other 
nations recognize America's greatness by noting that Europeans 
refer to our economy as "'the American Miracle'" (1985, 16). The 
following year the President rejuvenated the "America is back" 
theme by noting "Tonight, we look out on a rising America -- firm 
of heart, united in spirit, powerful in pride and patriotism. 
America is on the move" (1986, 3). He also complemented the 
American people for their greatness in contributing to the 
nation's renewal (1986, 6-7). In addition, he called the economy 
in America "the model to which the world once again turns" (1986, 
8). Reagan's affirmation of America's leadership was also 
evidenced by his 1986 proclamation that America can "out-produce, 
out-compete, and out-sell anybody, anywhere in the world" (1986, 
27). Finally, in 1987 Reagan celebrated "the core of America's 
greatness" as "being our best" (1987, 63) and as achieving "a 
level of excellence unsurpassed in history" (1987, 52). Reagan's 
ability to tribute America's greatness in his state of the Union 
speeches was echoed well by one author after listening to the 
1984 address: "This President never forgets the football fan 
desire of so many Americans to be 'No. l' •••• 1147 By fulfilling 
that desire with epideictic espousals, Reagan incited love for 
the country. 
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In conjunction with Reagan's narratives regarding America's 
greatness, the President also hailed the prosperity and wealth of 
our nation as a common value of the society. In the 1982 State 
of the Union Reagan proclaimed "prosperity for our nation" as one 
of "the oldest hopes of our republic" (1982, 6). In asking the 
citizens to meet that goal, Reagan urged: "seize these new 
opportunities to produce, to save, to invest, and together we'll 
make this economy a mighty engine of freedom, hope, and 
prosperity again" (1982, 41). As mentioned earlier, Reagan 
credited the American people for the growing prosperity and for 
creating an America "on the mend". By stating that the people 
contributed to the value of prosperity, Reagan unified his 
audience which could then feel involved in a "larger 
enterprise". President Reagan's "evangelical evocation of 
progress" 48 in his 1984 state of the Union address largely took 
the form of descriptions of an economically sound America. In 
the following year, Reagan praised the youth and strength of the 
American economy (1985, 20) after he incited a "Second American 
Revolution" (1985, 14) which he claimed would carry "us to new 
heights of progress by pushing back frontiers of knowledge and 
space" (1985, 14). Essentially, Reagan's focus on America's 
leadership and economic prosperity reminded the audience that 
they live in a great nation with a promising future. In that 
regard, he successfully celebrated the American value of living 
well. 
21 
Reagan also eloquently rehearsed the American values of 
peace and freedom in his State of the Union addresses. In 1982 
Reagan quoted historic leaders on the subject of freed~m: 
Washington ("'preservation of the sacred fire of liberty'"), 
Eisenhower ( "peace was purchased only at the price of strength"), 
and Kennedy ("the burden and glory that is freedom") (1982, 3-
4). In addition, he urged "all peace-loving peoples to join 
together ••• to speak and pray for freedom" (1982, 85). Reagan's 
recitation of these American values in the 1983 address 
thoroughly re-established the notion of liberty in the United 
States: 
America's leadership role in the world came to us because 
of our own strength and because of the values which 
guide us as a society: free elections, a free press, 
freedom of religious choice, free trade unions, and above 
all, freedom for the individual and rejection of the -
arbitrary power of the State. These values are the bed-
rock of our strength. (1983, 65) 
In 1984, Reagan reminded the audience that America is a nation 
that "champions peace that enshrines liberty, democratic rights, 
and dignity for every i ndi vi dual" ( 1984, 15). He also 
strategically addressed the Soviet people at the end of the 1984 
speech, which, in reality, was an epideictic affirmation of 
America's commitment to peace directed at the American, not 
Soviet, audience: 
Americans are people of peace. If your government 
wants peace there will be peace. We can come together 
in faith and friendship to build a safer and far better 
world for our children and our children's children. And 
the whole world will rejoice. That is my message to 
you. (1984, 70) 
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By addressing the people of Russia, Reagan assured the American 
audience that he was committed to the shared value of world 
peace. Finally, in both 1984 and 1985, Reagan stated that 
America was "safer, stronger, and more secure ••• than ever 
before" (1984, 66 and 1985, 1). The audience could take comfort 
in knowing that America remained committed to the related goals 
of peace and freedom and could rejoice at our nation's success in 
meeting those goals. Since Reagan effectively echoed these 
American values in his State of the Union addresses, he 
successfully meets Condit's second functional pair. 
Reagan's rehearsals of the above values were intended to 
instill patriotism in his audience. Hopefully, the nation would, 
be proud to be part of a country that was a world leader, more 
prosperous than ever before, full of freedom, and at peace with 
the world. In addition, Reagan constantly reminded his audience 
that respect had been restored to a great national symbol -- the 
military uniform -- by arguing that "our country's uniform is 
being worn once again with pride" (1982, 26: 1983, 69: 1984, 14: 
and 1987, 13). Reagan also praised the American people in 
recognition of how wonderful it is to live in our country. For 
example, in 1982 he applauded the American "volunteer spirit" 
(1982, 53), in 1983 the President commended the citizens for 
being "the most generous people on Earth" (1983, 83), and in 1987 
he affirmed that Americans can meet their "quest for excellence" 
by expending "American spirit and just plain American grit" 
(1987, 53). Evidently, Reagan knew the audience would take pride 
in being part of the wonderful breed known as Americans: "You 
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know they're Americans because their spirit is as big as the 
universe, and their hearts are bigger than their spirits" (1987, 
79). By defining the American in this way, Reagan made it 
difficult not to be proud of our heritage and values. As one 
author put it, the "abundant patriotic pageantry 11 49 in Reagan's 
State of the Union messages "reinforces the almost reflexive 
impulse to love America and its leader." 50 In other words, 
Reagan's use of the epideictic successfully created a powerful 
enthymeme since you are a citizen of America and I am 
America's leader, you must love both it and me. By appealing to 
patriotism, which necessarily includes respect and admiration for 
the president, Reagan essentially enhanced his credibility as a 
rhetor. This positive effect would have been difficult to 
accomplish with deliberative rhetoric. It seems that in all of 
his annual messages, Reagan tapped that "primordial chord"SI 
known as patriotism and excited the audience with epideictic 
rhetoric celebrating who we are and how we got that way. 
Reagan often told moving success stories of American heroes 
whose heroism makes us proud to live in the United States. By 
introducing tremendously patriotic and hard-working Americans who 
have beaten the odds, Reagan breathed new life into the American 
spirit. As he dramatically pointed out these genuine heroes in 
celebration of their accomplishments, he also cast a "mythic, 
even religious aura over them" 52 which ceremonized the occasion 
even more. In 1982 the chosen hero was Lenny Skutnik (1982, 99) 
whose brave rescue of a woman from the icy Potomac River, 
televised all over the nation, was still vivid in the minds of 
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the audience. (Reagan also graced the government he heads by 
pointing out that Skutnik was one of his employees.) In 1984 the 
President hailed the enterprises of Barbara Proctor "who rose 
from a ghetto shack to build a multi-million dollar advertising 
agency" (1984, 10) and Carlos Perez, "a Cuban refugee who turned 
twenty-seven dollars and a dream into a successful importing 
business" (1984, 10). 
Reagan's introduction of Sergeant Trujillo was perhaps the 
best example of his epideictic excellence in celebrating "what it 
means to be Americans" (1984, 71). Describing dramatically the 
bravery of Trujillo in saving his "wounded friends" despite an 
"imminent explosion" and "enemy fire" (1984, 72), Reagan 
concluded: "You not only saved innocent lives, you set a nation 
free. You inspire us as a force for freedom, not tyranny; for 
democracy, not despotism; and yes, for peace, not conquest -- God 
bless you" (1984, 73). Reagan's commendations of Father Ritter 
(director of Covenant House in New York) and Charles Carson (a 
crippled doctor who works 80 hours a week without pay) rendered 
his following rhetorical question answerable in only one way: 
"How can we not believe in the goodness and greatness of America" 
(1984, 75-77)? In 1985 the heroes were Clara Hale (a 79-year-old 
Harlem woman helping the children of drug addicts) and Jean 
Nguyen (a Vietnamese refugee who is a cadet at West Point).53 
Finally, in 1986, Reagan heroecized four children in order to 
inspire the audience and to exemplify the American dream as "a 
song of hope that rings through the night winter air" (1986,49). 
In every case, Reagan's heroes embodied the common values 
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indicative of America's greatness. By mentioning them, Reagan 
celebrated the shared heritage of his listeners and ignited new 
hopes for the fulfillment of dreams. This epideictic strategy 
exemplifies well the shape/share function of Condit's model. 
Reagan also wove the common desire of all Americans to reach 
their dreams into his State of the Union messages. By recreating 
the value of the American dream in his speeches, Reagan uplifted 
his audience. Of course, his "American heroes" evidenced well 
his claim that all dreams are reachable. In addition to his 
introductions of specific heroes, Reagan also mentioned the whole 
of "unsung heroes" (1982, 100) and "extra-ordinary 'ordinary' 
Americans" (1983, 91) in support of his assertion that "there is 
nothing we Americans cannot achieve as free men and women" (1983, 
89). 
Reagan often asked Americans to work for their dreams. In 
1984, Reagan defined America as a country "too great for small 
dreams" (1984, 6) before he urged Americans to "follow our dreams 
to distant stars" (1984, 38). In the 1985 address, the President 
summoned the audience to follow "the giants of our history ••• 
forward to the dreams their vision foresaw" (1985, 14). In the 
following year's speech, Reagan eloquently analogized dreaming to 
mountain-climbing when he stressed that "we cannot stop at the 
foothills when Everest beckons. It is time for America to be all 
that we can be" (1986, 9). In addition to asking Americans to 
dream, Reagan also assured them of success. The address given in 
1985 told the audience that Reagan's visions are "dreams we can 
make come true" '"(1985, 80) and the 1986 State of the Union 
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contained the admonition "let no one say that this nation-cannot 
reach the destiny of our dreams" (1986, 48). All in all, the 
President often utilized the tendency of all Americans to dream 
about success to his rhetorical advantage. In doing so, he 
fulfilled the crucial epideictic function of invigorating tired 
values and beliefs in celebration of America's greatness. 
Reagan often appealed to the audience's belief that the 
government should be fair to all citizens. In addition to 
offering verbal support to a vast array of special interest 
groups, Reagan also voiced his commitment to a tax system based 
on fairness. In 1982 Reagan assured his listeners that he would 
not "balance the budget on the backs of the American taxpayers" 
(1982, 41). In the following year Reagan offered to "simplify 
the tax code and make it fair for all Americans" (1983, 42). 
Once again, in 1984, the President proclaimed "simple fairness 
dictates that Government must not raise taxes on those struggling 
to pay their bills" (1984, 25). In this way, Reagan's support of 
a somewhat deliberative measure (no new taxes) became support of 
an American value. 
Similar support for the poor and needy was offered by Reagan 
in order to enhance his image of fairness. In 1984 Reagan asked 
"Can we love America and not reach out to tell them: You are not 
forgotten ••• " (1984, 12)? In 1985 and 1986 Reagan repeated his. 
promise of remembrance: "There must be no forgotten Americans" 
(1985, 28) and "we will never abandon those who, through no fault 
of their own, must have our help" (1986, 49). Reagan's 
rhetorical assurances tried to comfort his audience unsure of 
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his commitment to the value of fairness. Time magazine noted 
that Reagan's state of the Union address in 1983 "offered 
compassion ••• to those suffering from the recession" and that 
"it had soothing words for women, blacks, the elderly and others 
who have felt slighted by the Administration." 54 Reagan's 
invocation of this value gave him a better image in the public's 
eye. Following the 1986 address, one writer observed that 
Reagan's "concern for all America shines through his rhetoric and 
through him." 55 It also exemplified the President's ability to 
celebrate a shared American value. 
One of the President's most common appeals is to the value 
of family. His State of the Union addresses were not exceptions· 
to his rhetorical support of that value. In the 1984 State of 
the Union, Reagan proclaimed that "Families stand at the center 
of our society" (1984, 47). The next address contained Reagan's 
hope "For an America of wisdom that honors the family; knowing 
that as the family goes, so goes our civilization" (1985, 7). 
Finally, in 1986, Reagan mentioned the value of family nineteen 
times 56 in proclaiming family and community as "the co-stars of 
this Great American comeback" (1986, 7). Clearly, Reagan's 
emphasis on the family is a good example of his ability to renew 
common values. 
Ronald Reagan's invocation of God and religion is also a 
characteristic of his rhetorical style. One writer observed that 
"God never strays very far from Reagan's speeches."5 7 Reagan's 
"God bless you's" and "God bless America's" were common additions 
to his State of the Union speeches. He also referred to God in a 
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variety of other contexts within his annual reports. In 1982, 
Reagan celebrated America as a nation governed by "the rule of 
law under God" (1982, 94). In 1984 he alluded to American's "God-
given talents" (1984, 12). In the same address, Reagan offered a 
wonderful epideictic rehearsal of America's spiritual needs 
(following the largely deliberative support of school prayer 
legislation): 
America was founded by people who believed God was 
their rock of safety. He is ours. I recognize that 
we must be cautious in claiming that God is on our 
side. But I think it's all right to keep asking if 
we are on His side. (1984, 51) 
In the State of the Union address given in 1985, the President 
praised the uplift in American spirit and togetherness evidenced 
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by the increase in attendance at places of worship (1985, 52). 
Finally, Reagan's references to "God's children" (1985, 71 and 
1986, 44) climaxed with his introduction of the gospel music 
prodigy Tyrone Ford who has "God as his composer" (1986, 51). 
Reagan's celebration of God and American spirituality, especially 
in conjunction with other American values, is additional 
documentation of Reagan's epideictic success. 
Reagan's weaving of the above traditional values greatly 
enhanced his ability to unify his audience. In addition, the 
President focused on bipartisanship and togetherness in all of 
his State of the Union messages. In doing so, he avoided the 
"anathema" of divisiveness of which Condit wrote. Reagan's 
emphasis on unity locates his rhetoric squarely within the realm 
of the epideictic. In 1982, as Reagan evidenced the signs of 
American success, the President began seven consecutive 
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paragraphs with "Together, we " (1982, 21-27). Reagan also 
praised "bipartisan commissions" often: on Clean Air (1982, 56), 
on excellence in education (1984, 48), on protecting peace (1984, 
63), and on Central America (1984, 63). Reagan's "tone of 
commitment to bipartisanship"58 in his 1983 state of the Union 
address was reflected well by his introductory call for unity: 
"I would like to talk with you this evening about what we can do 
together -- not as Republicans or Democrats, but as Americans 
to make tomorrow's America happy ••• " (1983, 2). This de-
emphasis of political affiliation was also voiced in 1984: "When 
it comes to keeping America strong, free, and at peace, there 
should be no Republicans or Democrats, just patriotic Americans" 
(1984, 61). 
A key Reagan strategy for unifying America was acknowledging 
members of the immediate audience by addressing them directly. 
For example, in 1983, Reagan "saluted" the members of the 
commission on social security (as well as Senate Majority Leader 
Howard Baker and Speaker Tip O'Neill) "for a job well done" in 
"bipartisan spirit" (1983, 13-14). The following year, Reagan 
promised to work with Baker and O'Neill on deficit reduction 
(1984, 29). In 1986, Reagan eloquently displayed his ability to 
unify the audience with a tribute to the retiring Speaker of the 
House: 
Mr. Speaker, before I begin my prepared remarks, may 
I point out that tonight marks the 10th and last state 
of the Union Message that you've presided over. on 
behalf of the American people, I want to salute you 
for your service to Congress and country. Here's to 
you, Tip. (1986, 2) 
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Continuing in that spirit, Reagan told the Speaker shortly after 
the tribute that he desired to work together to repair the budget 
system: "Before we leave the city, let's you and I work together 
to fix it" (1986, 13). In 1987, Reagan appeased the members of 
the 100th Congress by invoking "special executive powers to 
declare that each of you must never be titled less than Honorable 
with a capital 'H'" (1987, 5). Shortly thereafter, Reagan 
renewed his pledge to work with the Speaker of the House (Jim 
Wright) and the Senate Majority Leader (Robert Byrd) after 
extending "warm congratulations" to the former (1987, 7-8). 
Strategically, Reagan's pledges, comments, and tributes to 
members of the immediate audience reinforced the country's belief 
that the government can work together to get things done. 
Through respect and rapport, Reagan convinced the American people 
that the government was still a harmonious entity. 
Reagan also addressed the nation in the spirit of unity in 
his State of the Union messages. In 1983, Reagan warned "men and 
women of both parties and every political shade" against the 
"short-term temptations of partisan politics" (1983, 18). In the 
same speech, Reagan's rhetoric summoning Ameri,cans to "walk this 
path together" (1983, 45) and to "work together to make America 
better" (1983, 94) prompted this response from a New York Times 
editorialist: "The State of the Union, to judge by the 
President's words, is togetherness. He talked about 
bipartisanship and working together a dozen times in his report 
to Congress." 59 Reagan's "bipartisan tenor"60 of his 1984 state 
of the Union was also directed at the American people. In the 
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opening remarks he commented: "Americans were ready to make a 
new beginning, and together we have done it" (1984, 7). Twice 
Reagan employed the "Together, we can ••• " strategy mentioned 
above in order to rally support for broad goals (1984, 17 and 
1984, 62). In the introductory remarks of the State of the Union 
message in 1985, Reagan praised the American people for bringing 
forth "a nation renewed" thanks to their "united effort" (1985, 
1). In 1986, Reagan's "path" (1983, 45) became a "last mile" 
that Americans h~d to walk together (1986, 25). Finally, in 
1987, Reagan's conclusion framed by "We the people" (1987, 71-80) 
celebrated eloquently the tradition of a nation united under 200 
years of Constitutional freedom and self-government. By 
stressing the bipartisan efforts of an America working together, 
Reagan successfully unified his audience and recreated the 
glorified image of Americans toiling arm in arm for the common 
good. In doing so, Reagan utilized largely epideictic rhetoric 
as defined by Condit's shape/share functional pair. In avoiding 
the divisiveness of controversial special interests, Reagan once 
again uplifted the American spirit. 
(Sometimes an event beyond the rhetor's control serves to 
unify an audience. A good example occurred in 1985 when the 
immediate audience sang "Happy Birthday" to President Reagan 
before he began his State of the Union address, which was 
scheduled on his 74th birthday. Although the display was 
somewhat contrived, the New York Times observed that nothing 
"could be more amiably bipartisan than singing 'Happy Birthday' 
to the President of the United States.")61
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Reagan's ability to incorporate and to rehearse key values 
of Americans was one of the great successes of his State of the 
Union messages. In rededicating these values, Reagan 
successfully utilized the epideictic rhetoric involved in 
Condit's shape/share functional pair. A few eloquent passages 
from his addresses displayed that incorporation and rehearsal 
quite well. In 1984, for example, Reagan said: 
The heart of America is strong, good, and true. The 
cynics were wrong -- America never was a sick society. 
We're seeing rededication to bedrock values of faith, 
family, work, neighborhood, peace, and freedom - values 
that help bring us together as one people, from the 
youngest child to the most senior citizen. (1984, 13) 
Later in that speech, Reagan asked the nation to strengthen "our. 
community of shared values •••• For us, faith, family, work, 
neighborhood, freedom and peace are not just words. They are 
expressions of what America means, definitions of what makes us 
good and loving people" (1984, 46). The following year, Reagan 
celebrated a nation renewed: 
Tonight, America is stronger because of the values 
we hold dear. We believe faith and freedom must be our 
guiding stars, for they show us truth, make us brave, 
give us hope, and leave us wiser than ever. Our 
progress began ••• in the hearts of' our families, 
communities, work places, and voluntary groups, which, 
together, are unleashing the invincible spirit of one 
great nation under God. (1985, 3) 
In each of these passages, Reagan's embodiment and espousal of 
our nation's shared heritage is clear. Reagan becomes the real. 
American. Perhaps this is one explanation of an author's 
conclusion that criticizing Reagan is like criticizing 
Yellowstone Park. 62 At any rate, Reagan masters the second 
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functional pair of epideictic rhetoric. Following the 1984 State 
of the Union address, Elizabeth Drew concluded: 
Reagan's sense of theatre is unmatched in politics, his 
use of language unique, and his capacity for arrogating 
unto himself the symbols and values America holds dear --
flag, family, God, patriotism, national strength -- awesome. 
He is the'master weaver of the national myths. 63
It is clear Reagan's State of the Union messages were epideictic 
successes in this regard. 
c. Display/Entertainment Functions 
The final pair in Condit's model of epideictic rhetoric 
focuses on the nature of the speaker as a showman who entertains· 
an audience of spectators during an epideictic speech. In this 
respect, Ronald Reagan's excellence as an epideictic rhetor is 
clear. Few could doubt that many of the stirring passages quoted 
above displayed Reagan's keen ability to perform on the political 
stage. Indeed, Reagan excited the national audience as he 
recited their shared values and ceremonized an America of 
greatness. Many authors have noted that Reagan's flawless 
ability to read from the Teleprompters with spontaneity and grace 
contributed to his ability to entertain.94 After every State of 
the Union speech, the popular press buzzed with the news of 
Reagan's success from a display standpoint. Their viewpoints 
will be used to support Reagan's success as an entertainer. 
After the 1982 State of the Union address, Time magazine 
noted that Reagan's "41-minute television performance ••• was 
vintage Reagan, as flawlessly paced and as forcefully persuasive 
as any of his campaign speeches"65 before praising his 
"showman's instinct." 66 Following the 1983 message, Reagan's 
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"actor's instinct" was hailed as the reason why he "reads a State 
of the Union message better than any President since Franklin 
67 Roosevelt." The following year, an editorialist for the New 
York Times noted Reagan's glowing showmanship throughout the 
annual message: "To watch him describe the State of the Union 
was to see brilliance on the political stage. Raising geniality 
to an art form, he gathered and he lucked and he shone •••• » 68 In 
1985 the President's "infectious buoyancy gave a lift to his 
performance before the television cameras 1169 as his "classic bit 
of political theatre 1170 was hailed by one writer impressed by 
Reagan's showmanship. Another magazine concluded that the speech 
"eclipsed his (Second) Inaugural Address" as he "wowed the 
national audience with bright visions of the future. 1171 
In reality, Ronald Reagan's "wowing" of the television 
audience was quite deliberate, often to the exclusion of the real 
audience -- Congress. Many authors have observed that Reagan 
directed most of his addresses to the secondary audience of 
spectators rather than to his primary Congressional audience of 
legislators. In other words, he addressed his comments to those 
least powerful to modify the problems. In this way, the 
Constitutional mandate to report and to recommend became Reagan's 
personal goal to display his eloquence in speech and to entertain 
the home viewers. After the 1985 address, Newsweek reported that 
Reagan turned his speech "into a kind of second Inaugural Address 
directed toward the American people rather than to congress and 
the rest of 'inside-the-beltway' washington. 072 Echoing that 
sentiment, Elizabeth Drew also noted that those in the House 
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Chamber were "mere props" for Reagan's performance before the 
television cameras.73 When seen in this light, Reagan's State of 
the Union messages become less of policy statements to Congress 
and more of exercises in telling the people what they desire to 
hear. In other words, he sacrificed Constitutional obligation in 
order to entertain. James Reston of the New York Times supported 
this analysis when he asked rhetorically: "In this sense, he has 
•united' the people behind him, but has he done so by telling the 
people the true 'State of the Union,' or by telling them what 
74they wanted to hear?" 
Reagan, in giving Americans an ideal and lofty picture of 
current and future condttions intermixed with shared dreams and 
values, simultaneously avoided a clear and logical "report" as 
well as effective and expedient "recommendations". Reagan guided 
the nation with State of the Union performances rather than with 
annual political policy-making. And there is every reason to 
believe that the audience was entertained. As one writer who 
said Reagan "makes Johnny Carson sound like an amateur" observed 
after the 1984 State of the Union performance: "And the people 
seem to love it. It's the best show on television. 1175 In this 
way, then, Reagan's rhetoric was largely successful from the 
epideictic standpoint located by Condit's display/entertainment 
functional pair. 
Indeed, Reagan's State of the Union addresses from 1982 to 
1987 were clear epideictic successes with respect to each part of 
Condit's model for this genre. The speeches defined major 
problems in terms of the audience's beliefs and values in order 
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to provide a comforting understanding, shaped the shared heritage 
of the audience in order to uplift the American spirit in 
eloquent unification, and displayed Reagan's unique ability to 
entertain an audience of spectators. From a deliberative stand-
point, however, Reagan's annual speeches largely failed. I have 
alluded to Reagan's inadequacies in that regard in the above 
analysis. That neglect becomes much clearer when one analyzes 
exactly what Reagan avoided in his ceremonies called "State of 
the Union". 
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III. Deliberative Failures 
Reagan's State of the Union messages were largely 
unsuccessful in terms of that genre's deliberative nature 
described in Chapter One. Granted, all of the President's annual 
messages contained policy suggestions and reviews which any 
rhetorician would classify as deliberative rhetoric. In this 
sense, the President at least minimally met the Constitutional 
requirements to report and to recommend to Congress. on the 
whole, however, these policy statements and specific directives 
were not central to any of Reagan's State of the Union 
addresses. Reagan's failure in terms of deliberative rhetoric 
can easily be supported from a textual analysis like the one 
given in the preceding chapter. Given limits of time and space, 
however, this analysis is designed to be illustrative rather than 
exhaustive. 
In 1982, Reagan needed to give deliberative specificity with 
regard to the troubled economy. In the State of the Union 
speech, Reagan had the opportunity to give executive direction in 
matters of specific economic policy. Reagan did "report" on the 
state of the economy. After exposing a litany of economic 
statistics and appraisals, the president revealed his strategy in 
doing so: "Our current problems ••• are the inheritance of 
decades of tax and tax, spend and spend" (1982, 32). In this 
way, Reagan reported the problems of the nation's economy in 
order to deny his responsibility for them. Of course, Reagan's 
38 
"recommendations" in 1982 were not policies at all. In 
actuality, they were decisions not to do what had been done 
before -- tax and spend. Moreover, these decisions were phrased 
in general terms of position and not policy. Thus, Reagan 
avoided the need for deliberative rhetoric that would have arisen 
if the president chose to give ,pecific tax and spending 
reduction policies. In its place, Reagan used epideictic 
rhetoric to gain popular support for his positions of lower taxes 
and budget frugality: reassurals to the poor and needy that they 
will not be forgotten (1982, 64), claims of fairness to American 
taxpayers (1982, 41), and philosophical support for free 
enterprise (1982, 49). In this way, Reagan successfully espoused 
an economic position and supported it with epideictic rhetoric 
without giving any deliberative recommendations of policy. 
Reagan's 1982 State of the Union address, despite the comforting 
words and hopeful visions, offered "no new initiatives to conquer 
h • • • II 76 t e economic crisis. Even the Republican leader Robert Michel 
argued that the speech "did not directly address the nation's 
economic plight. 1177 
Reagan's deliberative failures in 1982 can be seen in other 
areas of the speech. Many times the president voiced rhetorical 
support without corresponding policy elaboration. For example,. 
Reagan claimed that his Administration would have "concern for 
equal rights for women" (1982, 53) without giving deliberative 
details. Reagan also proclaimed to "seek transformation of our 
legal system" (1982, 55) without outlining the specifics of that 
transformation. Reagan's avoidance of the deliberative also 
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continued into the discussion of foreign policy. Rather than 
giving specific policies in the foreign realm, Reagan employed 
epideictic rhetoric intended to appeal to American values of 
strength and decisiveness. Instead of explaining new endeavors 
in relation to Cuba and Libya, Reagan said that "we will act with 
firmness" (1982, 59). With respect to problems in Poland, the 
president assured the audience that "further measures will 
follow" (1982, 62). In these cases and others, Reagan avoided 
the deliberative specifics which may have invited criticism. 
The avoidances continued in the 1983 State of the Union 
Address. Once again, Reagan hedged on recommending any new 
foreign policy programs. Instead, he espoused that the United 
States would bond in similar values with our allies (1983, 65-66) 
and would take "the initiative to make peace" {1983, 70) with our 
adversaries. In both cases, Reagan refused to outline policy 
specifics with deliberative rhetoric. 
The deliberative failure of Reagan in the 1983 address 
continued into his discussion of domestic affairs. Reagan 
declared "all-out war on big-time organized crime and drug 
racketeers" (1983, 56) but, unlike President Johnson with 
poverty, refused to elaborate on the war metaphor with policy 
specifics. In the same paragraph, Reagan announced "it is high. 
time we make our cities safe again" (1983, 56) but the appeal for 
safety was not accompanied by any policy recommendations. 
! 
Perhaps Reagan's largest deliberative failure in 1983 involved 
his handling of the deficit crisis. Rather than giving direct 
and specific policies for dealing with the deficits, the 
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president chose to use vague rhetoric which merely showed his 
support for lower deficits. Reagan told the audience that he 
would "hold the line on real spending" (1983, 37): "ask the 
Congress to adopt specific measures to control the growth of the 
so-called 'uncontrollable' spending programs" (1983, 39): and 
"propose a stand-by tax" in case the other "policies" failed to 
work (1983, 41). These vague positions allowed the president to 
appear supportive of deficit reduction without generating the 
controversy which would accompany specific spending cuts and tax 
increases. In fact, the only specific cut Reagan proposed in the 
address was a token $55 billion reduction over five years in the 
already inflated defense budget. Reagan's strategic avoidance of 
deliberative specifics may have backfired. As one author 
concluded: "Reagan's refusal to deal firmly with the deficit 
crisis was the main reason his speech received so little praise." 78 
When the deficit problem continued into 1983, Reagan once 
again failed to deal with it on a policy level in his State of 
the Union Address. Reagan's only "deliberative proposals" were 
to recommend that Congress review the suggestions of the Grace 
Commission (1984, 20) and to offer to work on a bipartisan effort 
to make a "down payment" on the deficit (1984, 27). In reality, 
Reagan used the deficit crisis to initiate epideictic rhetoric 
regarding defense spending and taxation. The president argued 
that further defense cuts would be dangerous because "we dare not 
shirk our responsibility to keep America free, secure, and at 
peace" (1984, 22). He also dismissed tax increases because 
"simple fairness dictates Government must not raise taxes on 
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families struggling to pay their bills" (1984, 25). After 
explaining what he would not do, and invoking the American values 
of peace and fairness, Reagan refused to explain what he would do 
to confront the crisis. In other words, he avoided shining the 
light on those that were soon to be under the knife. In "waiving 
79 the opportunity" to cite "specific examples" needed to reduce 
the deficit, Reagan merely "shook his rhetoric at it.~ 0 Once 
again, the deliberative requirement of the genre was slighted in 
favor of epideictic elements. 
Reagan's deliberative failures in 1984 were evident in other 
areas of the speech. With respect to civil rights legislation, 
Reagan only touched the issue by asserting that there would be no 
more "barriers of bigotry or discrimination" ( 1984, 18). Sexual 
discrimination was similarly avoided -- Reagan gave only a 
glimmer of statistical hope but no specific policies (1984, 11). 
Lebanon was also avoided by Reagan in terms of deliberative 
specifics. Instead of offering new policies, Reagan merely said 
that he would "forward shortly legislative proposals" and would 
"be seeking support from our allies" (1984, 64). Finally, Reagan 
also failed to give new initiatives with respect to nuclear arms 
control. Instead, the president used the epideictic strategy of 
addressing the Soviet people to show the country's support for a 
"sane policy" in the nuclear age (1984, 67-70). The Nation also 
observed these avoidances of policy specifics in the 1984 State 
of the Union: "He never mentioned civil rights, he sloughed off 
sexual discrimination in one skewed statistic, he raced through 
Lebanon in one paragraph, and he disposed of the nuclear 
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nightmare with a personal appeal to the soviet people. ,.Sl With 
regard to that last avoidance, Hedrick Smith of the New York 
Times agreed that Reagan's epideictic affirmation of peace to the 
audience came at the expense of offering "new proposals to break 
the stalemate (between Russia and the United States). 1182 In this 
case and the others, Reagan's deliberative neglect in the 1984 
State of the Union Address is clear. 
Problems for Reagan at the policy level of rhetoric also 
surfaced the following year. The deliberative failure in the 
1985 address was reflected in the sentiment of Marci MacDonald in 
MacLeans magazine: "He glossed over three of the gravest 
problems with which his administration was wrestling last week: 
the record $222-billion budget deficit; his proposed $51-billion 
in spending cuts for fiscal year 1986, which ran into bipartisan 
opposition on Capitol Hill; and the worst farm crisis to hit the 
United States ~ince the Great Depression. 1183 . The "gloss" on the 
farm crisis was the clearest deliberative failure. Reagan 
recognized the farmer's plight and their need for an "orderly 
transition to a market-oriented farm economy," but his speech 
merely cited vague "fundamental reforms" without giving any 
policy specifics (1985, 39). Ms. MacDonald also concluded that 
"the speech yielded few indications of his second-term 
agenda. 1184 That conclusion was especially valid with respect 
to budgetary policy. Reagan's concern for his popular image at 
the expense of giving the audience specific direction in dealing 
with the budget crisis was also voiced by Senator Mark Andrews: 
"The president has to c~me down out of the clouds. In the state 
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of the Union he enhanced his own standing, but he didn't address 
h h . d h d . . 185t e meat oft e issue -- an t at's the federal ef1c1t. 1 
fact, the word "deficit" was mentioned only three times.) 
over Reagan's 1985 failure was evidenced by one author's 
conclusion that the President's "avoidance of unpleasant 
(In 
Dismay 
specifics" led to the abandonment of the Constitutional pattern 
for state of the Union addresses. 86 
In the 1985 State of the Union Address, Reagan also voiced 
support of positions without giving policy details that may have 
generated controversy or criticism. Reagan announced that "it is 
time to liberate the spirit of enterprise in the most distressed 
areas of our country" (1985, 26) without citing the specific 
initiatives required to achieve that liberation. Reagan's 
assurance that his Administration would "meet its responsibility 
to help those in need" (1985, 27) was also not accompanied by 
policy details. Reagan also asserted that "it is time we 
restored domestic tranquility" (1985, 62) without citing specific 
recommendations. Finally, in the foreign policy area, the 
president's claim to "nourish and defend freedom and democracy" 
(1985, 72) was also silent at the policy level. In each of these 
instances, Reagan failed to give deliberative direction to 
Congress. 
The 1986 State of the Union was also a deliberative 
failure. Once again, Reagan refused to define and recommend 
specific policies. The president gave rhetorical support for the 
ends of legislation without giving the specific means to achieve 
those ends. For example, Reagan explained that true tax reform 
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must be "pro-family, pro-jobs, pro-future, and pro-America" 
(1986, 26) without citing the exact nature of those needed 
reforms. Reagan vowed to oppose legislation that would restrict 
free trade (1986, 27) but did not describe the legislation in 
that area which he would support. In addition, Reagan once again 
recognized the plight of American farmers who had been subject to 
"unwise government policies" (1986, 28) but stopped short of 
initiating new "wise policies" to help them with their problems. 
Finally, the president vowed to "achieve democracy in Nicarauga" 
(1986, 45) without outlining specific deliberative action needed 
to achieve that goal. 
Reagan's failure in 1986 from a deliberative perspective was 
echoed in the press. After the speech, the New York Times noted 
that the "unusually short speech offered few specific legislative 
proposals. 1187 In that light, an author for The New Republic 
called "Reagan's evasions" on budgetary legislation a "cowardly 
approach of failing to cite specific cuts."88 Concluded the 
author: "Instead of accepting his presidential obligation to 
face unpleasant truths ••• Reagan sketched a dazzling scheme for 
two-hour plane rides to Tokyo. 1189 Other authors were more 
lenient in citing Reagan's deliberative failures in the 1986 
State of the Union speech. Noted one: it was "a bit too glib 
about the details. 1190 Others, like William Safire, were more 
harsh: 
If a President chooses to ignore the Constitutional 
requirement for a report of the State of the Union, 
and prefers instead to mobilize support for his 
philosophy, his speech should spell out the sacrifices 
he expects for the benefits he promises. That is his 
job, nobody else's, and it requires political courage. 
In his hodgepodge speech, President Reagan flinched. 91 
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In 1987, Reagan had another opportunity to deliver a largely 
deliberative speech rather than his usual ceremonial invocations 
of America's values and beliefs. Dennis Thomas, a Presidential 
Assistant, composed a State of the Union speech that was 
essentially "a laundry list of legislative proposals. 1192 But in 
the end, Reagan chose a competing value draft written by Ken 
Khachigian because he felt "more comfortable with it.~ 3 The New 
York Times, however, attributed Reagan's choice to Nancy Reagan's 
preferences.94 At any rate, the speech as delivered was the 
typical Reagan avoidance of deliberative specifics. 
Once again, Reagan's deliberative failure in the annual 
report was seen in a variety of areas in which the president 
could have offered new policy initiatives. Reagan supported a 
"political solution" in Afghanistan (1987, 25} but did not 
outline specific steps which needed to be taken in order to 
achieve that solution. Reagan also alluded to a new welfare 
policy without giving specifics to the audience (1987, 49-50). 
Instead, he used the allusion to ensure the poor and elderly that 
whatever the policy would entail, it would not abandon their 
needs. The president's "quest for excellence" strategy also did 
not contain any policy specifics (1987, 53). Finally, Reagan 
once again invoked a "crusade against drugs" (1987, 58} without· 
outlining the crusade's policy content. Reagan's failure in 1987 
was also noticed by the Congressional audience and by the press. 
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Representative Jim Leach of Iowa commented that "the tenor was 
absolutely right, but the substance was lacking. 1195 Another 
author noted that the 1987 performance "offered no plan for the 
96 future." Finally, an article in Time concluded that the 
President's view of the State of the Union was backed up "mainly 
by exhortation rather than specific proposals. 119 7 
The clear deduction from the above analysis is that Reagan 
either downplayed or ignored the deliberative nature of the State 
of the Union message as required by the Constitution. In 
ceremonizing the occasion, Reagan largely missed the reason for 
the ceremony -- to report on the state of the Union and to offer 
new, expedient measures of policy. In other words, his annual 
speeches failed to address the deliberative functions of the 




Speeches of a genre "have conventional forms because they 
arise in situations with similar structures and elements and 
because rhetors respond in similar ways, having learned from 
precedent what is appropriate and what effects their actions are 
likely to have on other people."98 In other words, speeches 
within a similar genre will tend to be alike because the rhetors 
giving those speeches are likely to have similar situational 
demands. However, some situations are more "demanding" from a 
rhetorical standpoint than other situations. These instances are 
more constraining to a rhetor in terms of what choices can be 
made in responding to rhetorical problems. An example of a 
highly constraining genre is the eulogy. A eulogizing rhetor 
must conform his or her rhetorical style to severe social demands 
and taboos. "Violations" of this genre are easily identified. 
Other genres are less constraining. In these situations, a 
rhetor has greater latitude in formulating strategies and styles 
to meet rhetorical problems. The State of the Union address 
exemplifies a genre with "lighter" situational demands. 
Presidents are not highly limited by the Constitution in their 
approach to the annual message. In addition, the functional 
duality mentioned in Chapter One illustrates the latitude of the 
state of the Union genre. It functions largely in the manner 
that the president desires it to function. Rhetoric is tailored 
to meet those presidential desires. Strategies are chosen to 
48
conform with the intended function. The genre of the State of 
the Union address guides a president in making these choices, but 
it does not necessarily limit him. It is a genre of functional 
choice, but not one of functional constraint. 
Ronald Reagan's decision to emphasize epideictic functions 
of the State of the Union address at the expense of deliberative 
functions is obvious when one considers the textual analysis 
presented in Chapter Two and Chapter Three. In light of this 
research, a hasty solution to the critical problem of discerning 
this genre's "dominant" function would be to conclude that the 
State of the Union has primarily an epideictic function which is 
met through epideictic rhetoric. However, I could easily have 
chosen a different president to illustrate the dominance of the 
deliberative function. For this reason, the proper solution to 
the critical problem is that the function of the State of the 
Union address is determined not by the genre, but by the rhetor. 
In other words, the function of the State of the Union message is 
not limited by constraint of genre. 
Granted, this conclusion does not really solve the critical 
problem at all. Reagan's preference for epideictic rhetoric does 
not necessarily mean that the state of the Union address 
functions·primarily as an epideictic speech~ It also does not 
mean that .Reagan is an aberration because the genre is supposed 
to function as an exclusively deliberative mode of discourse. 
What it does indicate is that the genre is loosely defined by 
precedent and situation in terms of function. A presidential 
rhetor must decide which function of the address to accentuate 
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based upon his nature as a rhetor. A president must assess his 
ability, talent, image, personality, and past successes and 
failures in order to determine which function of the address to 
emphasize. For this reason, the way in which a president handles 
the State of the Union address illuminates much about the 
president himself. In other words, the textual analysis of this. 
thesis says more about Reagan as a rhetor than about the State of 
the Union as a genre. 
Reagan's choice of epideictic rhetoric and neglect of 
deliberative rhetoric illustrates his nature as a rhetor. 
Initially, it points to the fact that Reagan likes to avoid 
specifics and details. The president's shunning of policy 
specificity indicates his preference for broad themes and general 
positions. Secondly, Reagan's dominant use of epideictic 
rhetoric demonstrates that he tends to see problems and issues in 
terms of values rather than in terms of new policies and 
initiatives. Reagan reduces everything to a value position 
whether its Lebanon, social spending, abortion, or education. 
For this reason, Reagan attempts to transcend specific problems 
by appealing to fundamental beliefs with epideictic rhetoric 
instead of attacking those problems with deliberative policies. 
His State of the Union messages illustrate these attempts well. 
Reagan's emphasis of the epideictic also indicates his 
desire to avoid conflict at all, costs. For this reason, Reagan 
always stops short of suggesting controversial policies which may 
alienate and offend certain groups. 
rhetor of unity and not of division. 
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Reagan, above all, is a 
As a rhetor, Reagan would 
rather ask Congress to "study" a problem with a "bipartisan 
commission" than stick out his neck with a bold solution that has 
a potential to offend. Reagan perceives his role as one of 
unification. His State of the Union messages support this 
claim. Perhaps this is why he refuses to set his agenda in the 
annual message. Specific policies are strategically left for a 
later written report to Congress. In the speech itself, policies 
are deliberately subordinated to his attempts to uplift, inspire, 
and unify the- national audience. For this reason, Reagan's state 
of the Union Addresses are largely messages to the people rather 
than directions to Congress. To maintain that popular 
leadership, Reagan utilizes the power of epideictic speech and 
sacrifices the limits of the deliberative. 
Of course, Reagan's functional choices in his State of the 
Union messages also illustrate his shortcomings as a policy 
leader. Reagan's neglect of policy recommendations evidences the 
fact that he is "intellectually lazy" and "uninformed" on a wide 
f 1 . . 99 range o po icy issues. Reagan's avoidance of deliberative 
rhetoric illustrates the fact that the president is relatively 
incompetent to discuss most problems in policy terms. For 
Reagan, it does not matter that the words he uses are factual, 
accurate, and specific. He is only concerned that they are 
presented well and sound good to the audience. IOO These ideas 
buttress the claim that Reagan ~argely sacrifices content for 
showmanship. Thus, one's opinion of Reagan as a rhetor may 
depend on whether one watches him on television or reads a 
transcript. one writer who experimented by reading rather than 
51 
watching Reagan's 1984 State of the Union Address concluded: "It 
works! The scales have fallen from my eyes. What a horrible old 
bilgemeister he is." lOl These shortcomings illustrated by 
Reagan's first seven State of the Union messages may have grave 
implications for our government and our nation. 
The net effect of a predominately epideictic state of the 
Union speech without a corresponding deliberative treatment of 
the nation's problems is a foggy view of our nation's condition 
and a distorted picture of the future. Granted, Reagan's State 
of the Union messages are eloquent celebrations of American 
spirit and character. But when the problems at hand are dealt 
102 with by transforming the address into a "national pep talk" 
with policy initiatives "sunk in a swamp of schmaltz," 103 our 
nation largely suffers. What becomes of positive legislative 
change when our President reduces himself to the halftime 
football coach who tells his team in the locker room that "they 
can do it" without offering specific strategies for "doing it"? 
What becomes of honest assessments and needed presidential 
directions when the voices of our Founding Fathers are 
subordinated to the voice of the First Lady? At what point does 
our nation draw the line at changes which are "more rhetorical 
than substantive? 11104 What becomes of the nation's realistic 
perception of our country's condition when, as the Democrats 
alleged in their televised response to the 1987 State of the 
Union address, there is a "gap between the rhetoric and the 
reality?" lOS What happens to a country in which "the rhetoric 
tailored for television is employed for the daily decisions of 
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106 government?" Finally, what lies ahead for our great nation 
when "it's not easy for the people to judge the State of the 
Union in these television days?" 107 
Broadly speaking, the United States cannot progress if the 
President does not fulfill the deliberative nature of the State 
of the Union address. Reagan's epideictic rhetoric and 
ceremonial invocations of America's greatness did little to make 
our lives substantially better in the long-run. Without 
deliberative rhetoric that is thorough, clear, honest, and 
expedient: the State of the Union address is reduced to "unequal 
political propaganda." lOB In effect, the crisis in epideixis 
leads to a condition in which "we no longer insist that the 
president's words mean what they appear to say." 109 Without 
presidential truth and frankness in assessing our country's past, 
present, and future: the annual ceremony becomes almost 
meaningless. Call me an idealist, but I would much prefer some 
substance with my style, some policy with my pride, some 
deliberative rhetoric with my epideictic. Ronald Reagan's 
beautiful State of the Union addresses were successful from an 
epideictic perspective: however, didn't the Framers of our 
constitution have more in mind when they entrusted the President 
with this powerful responsibility? If our leader will not 
accurately and thoroughly assess our country's condition and 
offer substantial strategies f o.r coping with current problems, 
then who will? I take comfort in knowing that at least one 
writer agrees with this point of view, even if that author is the 
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pseudonymous Jeremiah Baruch, who wrote: 
What if the "Great Communicator" dropped the rhetorical 
flourishes and euphemistic vocabulary and set about to 
convince Congress in a straight-forward fashion? Is there 
still a place for the considered presentation and 
reasoned discourse that would allow the public to 
understand the administration's agenda and judge whether 
or not it is in the national interest?llO 
I would most certainly hope so. 
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